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a b s t r a c t
In a designated verifier proxy signature scheme, one can delegate his or her signing
capability to another user in such a way that the latter can sign messages on behalf of the
former, but the validity of the resulting signatures can only be verified by the designated
verifier. Several designated verifier proxy signature schemes have been proposed so far.
However, most of the schemes were proven secure in the random oracle model, which has
received a lot of criticism since the security proofs in the random oracle model are not
sound with respect to the standard model. In this paper, we propose a new construction
of designated verifier proxy signature whose security can be proven without using the
random oracle model. Our scheme is inspired by Waters’ Identity-based encryption. The
unforgeability of our scheme is based on the hardness of Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman
problem. As far as we know, this is the first designated verifier proxy signature secure in
the standard model.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The concept of proxy signaturewas first introduced byMambo et al. [1] in 1996. In a proxy signature scheme, the original
signer can delegate his or her signing capability to a proxy signer and then the proxy signer can create valid signatures on
behalf of the original signer. When a verifier receives a proxy signature, he should not only verify the correctness by a given
verification procedure, but also be convinced of the original signer’s agreement on the signed message. Proxy signature
schemes have been suggested for use in a number of applications, including electronic commerce, e-cash and distributed
shared object systems. According to the type of delegation, proxy signatures can be classified into three types: full delegation,
partial delegation and delegation by warrant. Based on the knowledge of the proxy private key, proxy signatures can be
classified into proxy-protected and proxy-unprotected. In a proxy-protected scheme, only the proxy signer can generate
valid proxy signatures, while in a proxy-unprotected scheme, either the original signer or the proxy signer can produce
proxy signatures since both of them have a knowledge on the proxy private key. In many applications, proxy-protected
proxy signature schemes are required to avoid the potential dispute between the original signer and the proxy signer. Many
new proxy signature schemes [2–10] have been proposed till now and moreover, combined with other signatures with
particular properties, some new kinds of proxy signature have been proposed, such as proxy blind signature [11], proxy
multi-signature [12], threshold proxy signature [13], proxy ring signature [14] and so on.
Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo [15] introduced a new primitive named designated verifier proofs in 1996. Such a proof
enables a prover Alice to convince a designated verifier Bob that a statement is true, while Bob cannot use the proof to
convince others of this fact, since Bob himself can simulate such a proof. Furthermore, Jakobsson et al. proposed a designated
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verifier signature scheme in the sense that only the designated verifier can be convinced that a signature is produced by the
claimed signer. In this scheme, anyone can validate a signature, although he cannot determine whether this signature was
produced by the signer or simulated by the designated verifier. Jakobsson et al. also discussed a stronger concept called
strong designated verifier signature in the same paper. In 2004, Saeednia, Kremer and Markowitch [16] formally defined
the notion of strong designated verifier signature and proposed a concrete scheme. In Saeednia et al.’s scheme, anyone,
without the knowledge of the designated verifier’s secret key, can not check the validity of a signature. We refer the readers
to [15–17] for more details about designated verifier signatures.
Let us consider a scenario where the proxy signer wishes to protect his signing privilege from knowing by other parties.
In other words, the proxy signer only wants to convince the designated receiver that he has signed the specific message. In
2003, Dai et al. [18] proposed such a scheme called designated verifier proxy signature, which provides authentication of a
messagewithout providing a non-repudiation property of traditional digital signature. A designated verifier proxy signature
scheme can be used to convince the designated verifier and only the designated verifier whether a signature is valid or
not. This is due to the fact that the designated verifier can always generate a valid signature intended for himself that is
indistinguishable from an original signature. This kind of signature is useful in electronic commerce applications, such as
the sale of digital products [19]. For instance, when a customer Cindy wants to buy a digital book from an Internet vender
Bob, she needs a digital receipt from Bob to guarantee the quality, authenticity and legality of the book. This is reasonable
since Cindy does not completely trust Bob and his goods. Moreover, Cindywould expect that the receipt is boundedwith not
only the identity of Bob but also that of the book producer, say Alice. With such a receipt, Cindy will be convinced that the
digital book is produced by Alice and sold by Bob. At the same time, to prevent Cindy illegally distributes the digital book to
others, Alice and Bob want the validity of Cindy’s receipt can only be verified by Cindy. Designated verifier proxy signature
can be used as such a receipt. That is, Alice delegates her signing capability to Bob so that he can generate designated verifier
proxy signatures for all customers as digital receipts. Unfortunately, Wang [19] pointed out there exists a forgery attack in
Dai et al.’s scheme. Huang et al. [20] proposed a short designated verifier proxy signature from pairings to improve the
communication efficiency. Lu et al. [21] proposed a designated verifier proxy signature scheme with message recovery in
2005 and a new designated verifier proxy signature scheme from bilinear pairings in 2006. Zhang and Mao [22] proposed a
novel ID-based designated verifier signature scheme very recently.
Provable security is very essential for designated verifier proxy signature schemes. However, to our knowledge, only
Huang et al.’s scheme [20] and Lu et al.’s scheme [23] provide the security proof in the random oracle model proposed by
Bellare and Rogaway [24]. Although the model is efficient and useful, it has received a lot of criticism that the proofs in the
model are not perfect. They are simply a design validation methodology capable of spotting defective or erroneous designs
when they fail. Therefore, to find a secure designated verifier proxy signature scheme secure in the standard model is an
interesting research problem.
Our contribution: Most existing proxy signature schemes were constructed as follows. The original signer Alice sends a
warrant and the corresponding signature to the proxy signer Bob. Bob derives his proxy secret key using his secret key
and the information sent by Alice. With this proxy secret key, Bob can generate proxy signatures on behalf of Alice by
using a standard signature scheme. When a proxy signature is given, a verifier first recovers the proxy public key, and then
validates its correctness by employing the corresponding standard signature verification procedure. However, as shown by
many papers [19,3,6], this kind of method should be carefully used since some security drawbacks may exist. Those attacks
mainly result from the fact that a valid proxy key pair can be forged by an adversary, including the original signer and the
proxy signer. In this paper, we propose the first designated verifier proxy signature scheme whose security does not rely on
the random oracles. By employingWaters’ hashing technique [25] carefully, we obtain a concrete secure designated verifier
proxy signature scheme. As for the security, we classify the potential adversaries into three kinds according to their attack
power, and prove that the proposed scheme is unforgeable against all kinds of adversaries in the standard model.
Roadmap: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some preliminary works are given in Section 2. The formal models
of designated verifier proxy signature scheme is described in Section 3. Our designated verifier proxy signature scheme
without random oracles is presented in Section 4. We analyze the proposed scheme in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are
given in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we will review some fundamental backgrounds used in this paper, including bilinear pairings and
complexity assumptions.
2.1. Bilinear pairings
Let G and GT be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p and g be a generator of G. The map e : G× G→ GT
is said to be an admissible bilinear pairing if the following conditions hold true.
(1) e is bilinear, i.e. e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for all a, b ∈ Zp.
(2) e is non-degenerate, i.e. e(g, g) 6= 1GT .
(3) e is efficiently computable.
1354 Y. Yu et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 57 (2009) 1352–1364
We refer the reader to [26] for more details on the construction of such pairings.
2.2. Complexity assumptions
Definition 1 (Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) Problem in (G,GT )). Given (g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G) for some unknown a, b, c ∈ Zp,
computew = e(g, g)abc ∈ GT .
Definition 2 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (DBDH) Problem in (G,GT )). Given (g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G) for some unknown
a, b, c ∈ Zp andw ∈ GT , decide whetherw = e(g, g)abc .
A DBDH oracle ODBDH is that on input (g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G) andw ∈ GT , output 1 ifw = e(g, g)abc and 0 otherwise.
Definition 3 (Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (GBDH) Problem in (G,GT )). Given (g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G) for some unknown a, b, c ∈
Zp, computew = e(g, g)abc ∈ GT with the help of DBDH oracle ODBDH .
The probability that a polynomial bounded algorithmA can solve the GBDH problem is defined as
SuccGBDHA = Pr[e(g, g)abc ← A(G,GT , g, ga, gb, gc,ODBDH)].
Definition 4 (Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (GBDH) Assumption in (G,GT )). Given (g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G) for some unknown
a, b, c ∈ Zp, SuccGBDHA is negligible.
3. Formal models of designated verifier proxy signature
In this section, wewill describe the outline and the security requirements of designated verifier proxy signature schemes.
3.1. Outline of designated verifier proxy signature
There exists three participants in a designated verifier proxy signature scheme, namely Alice, Bob and Cindy, who act as
the original signer, the proxy signer and the designated verifier respectively. A designated verifier proxy signature scheme
consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, this algorithm outputs the system parameters.
• KeyGen: It takes as input the security parameter k and outputs the secret-public key pair (ski, pki) for i ∈ {a, b, c} denotes
Alice, Bob and Cindy.
• DelegationGen: Given the system’s parameter, the original signer’s private key and the warrant W to be signed, this
algorithm outputs the delegation σW .
• ProxySign: This algorithm takes as input the proxy signer’s private key skb, the delegation σW , the designated verifier’s
public key pkc and a messagem to generate a signature σ .
• Verify: A deterministic algorithm that accepts a message m, the warrant W , a signature σ , the original signer and the
proxy signer’s public key (pka, pkb), the designated verifier’s private key skc and returns > if the signature is valid,
otherwise returns⊥ indicating the signature is invalid.
• Transcript simulation: An algorithm that accepts a messagem, a warrantW and the verifier’s private key skc to produce
an identically distributed transcript σ ∗ that is indistinguishable from the original designated verifier proxy signature σ .
3.2. Security notions
There are three types adversaries in the system.
Type 1 adversaryA1 only has the public keys of Alice and Bob.
Type 2 adversaryA2 has the public keys of Alice and Bob, he additionally has the secret key of the original signer Alice.
Type 3 adversaryA3 has the public keys of Alice and Bob, he additionally has the secret key of the proxy signer Bob.
One can find that if a designated verifier proxy signature scheme is unforgeable against Type 2 and Type 3 adversary, it is
also unforgeable against Type 1 adversary. In a warrant-based proxy signature scheme, the delegation is original signer’s
standard signature on the warrant which contains proxy’s public key, a period of validity, the restrictions on the messages
that the signer can sign and so on. Therefore, this kind of proxy signature can prevent the misuse of the delegation.
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3.3. Attack model
Existential unforgeability against adaptiveA2 adversary
The existential unforgeability of a designated verifier proxy signature scheme under a type 2 adversary requires that it is
difficult for the original signer to generate a valid proxy signature of a messageM∗ under the warrantW ∗ that has not been
signed by the proxy signer. It is defined using the following game between the challenger C and a type 2 adversaryA2.
• Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm to obtain system’s parameters, runs KeyGen algorithm to obtain the
secret-public key pairs (ska, pka), (skb, pkb), (skc, pkc) of the original signer Alice, proxy signer Bob and the designated
verifier Cindy, respectively. C then sends (pka, pkb, pkc, ska) to the adversaryA2.
• ProxySign queries: A2 can request a proxy signature on the message M under the warrant W with the original signer
Alice, the proxy signer Bob and the designated verifier Cindy. In response, C outputs a signature σ and returns it toA2.
• Verify queries:A2 can request a signature verification on a pair (M,W , σ )with the original signer Alice, the proxy signer
Bob and the designated verifier Cindy.C outputs> ifσ is a valid designated verifier proxy signature onM , or⊥ otherwise.
• Output: Finally,A2 outputs a new pair (M∗,W ∗, σ ∗), such that
(1) (M∗,W ∗) has never been queried during the ProxySign queries.
(2) σ ∗ is a valid designated verifier proxy signature of messageM∗ under warrantW ∗ for the original signer Alice, proxy
signer Bob and the designated verifier Cindy.
The success probability of an adversaryA2 wins the above game is defined as SuccA2 . We say that a type 2 adversaryA2
can (t, qps, qv, ) break a designated verifier proxy signature scheme if A2 makes at most qps proxy signature queries, qv
verification queries in time at most t and SuccA2 is at least .
Existential unforgeability against adaptiveA3 adversary
Inspired by the work of [20], we provide a formal definition of existential unforgeability of a designated verifier proxy
signature scheme against Type 3 adversary. It is defined using the following game between an adversaryA3 and a challenger
C.
• Setup: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to obtain system’s parameters, runs KeyGen algorithm to obtain the
secret-public key pairs (ska, pka), (skb, pkb), (skc, pkc) of the original signer Alice, proxy signer Bob and the designated
verifier Cindy, respectively. C then sends (pka, pkb, pkc, skb) to the adversaryA3.
• Delegation queries:A3 can request the delegation on thewarrantW . The challengerC runs the DelegationGen algorithm
to obtain σW and returns it toA3.
• ProxySign queries: A3 can request a designated proxy signature on the pair (M,W ) with the original signer Alice, the
proxy signer Bob and the designated verifier Cindy. In response, C outputs a signature σ and returns it toA3.
• Verify queries:A3 can request a signature verification query on a pair (M,W , σ )with the original signer Alice, the proxy
signer Bob and the designated verifier Cindy. C outputs > if σ is a valid designated verifier proxy signature on M , or ⊥
otherwise.
• Output: Finally,A3 outputs a new pair (M∗,W ∗, σ ∗), such that
(1) W ∗ has not been requested as one of the delegation queries.
(2) (M∗,W ∗) has not been requested as one of the proxy signature queries.
(3) σ ∗ is a valid designated verifier proxy signature of themessageM∗ under thewarrantW ∗ for the original signer Alice,
the proxy signer Bob and the designated verifier Cindy.
The success probability of an adversary A3 wins the above game is defined as SuccA3 . We say that a type 3 adversary
A3 can (t, qw, qps, qv, ) break a designated verifier proxy signature scheme ifA3 makes at most qw delegation queries, qps
proxy signature queries, qv verification queries in time at most t and SuccA3 is at least .
4. Designated verifier proxy signature scheme without random oracles
In this section, we describe our designated verifier proxy signature scheme. As assumed earlier, there are three
participants in the system, namely Alice, Bob and Cindy, who act as the original signer, the proxy signer and the designated
verifier. In the following, all the messages to be signed will be represented as bit strings of length n. To construct a more
flexible scheme which allows messages of arbitrary length, a collision resistant Hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n should
be employed. Our scheme consists of the following algorithms.
Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let (G,GT ) be bilinear groups where |G| = |GT | = p for some prime p, g is the
generator of G. e denotes an admissible pairing G × G → GT . Pick u′,m′ ∈ G and vectors Eu = (ui), Em = (mi) of length n,
whose entries are random elements from G. The public parameters are (G,GT , e, u′,m′, Eu, Em).
Keygen: Alice picks randomly xa, ya ∈ Z∗p and sets her secret key ska = (xa, ya). Then she computes her public key pka =
(pkax, pkay) = (gxa , gya). Similarly, Bob’s secret key is skb = (xb, yb) and the public key is pkb = (pkbx, pkby) = (gxb , gyb).
Cindy’s secret key is skc = (xc, yc) and her public key is pkc = (pkcx, pkcy) = (gxc , gyc ).
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DelegationGen: LetW be an n-bit message called warrant to be signed by the original signer andWi denotes the i-bit ofW ,
andW ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all i for whichWi = 1. The original signer picks a random ra ∈ Zp and computes the
delegation σW = (σW1 , σW2) and sends it to the proxy signer Bob, where
σW1 = gxaya
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)ra
, σW2 = g ra .
ProxySign: Let M be an n-bit message to be signed by the proxy signer Bob and Mi denotes the i-bit of M , and M ⊆
{1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all i for which Mi = 1, the proxy signature is generated as follows. First, the proxy signer Bob
picks two random values r ′a, rb ∈ Zp. Then the proxy signature σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) onM is constructed as:
σ1 = e
σW1
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)r ′a
gxbyb
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi
)rb
, pkcx
 ,
σ2 = σW2g r
′
a , σ3 = g rb .
Verification: To check whether σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) is a valid proxy signature on the message M under the warrantW , Cindy
uses her secret key to verify whether the following equation holds.
σ1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ3
)xc
.
If the equality holds, Cindy accepts the signature σ , otherwise rejects it.
Transcript simulation
Cindy can use her private key to compute a signature on an arbitrary message M∗ with the warrantW ∗. She picks two
random value r1, r2 ∈ Z∗p and computes σ ∗ = (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 , σ ∗3 )where σ ∗2 = g r1 , σ ∗3 = g r2 and
σ ∗1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W∗
ui, σ ∗2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M∗
mi, σ ∗3
)xc
.
5. Analysis of the scheme
In this section, we will firstly show the correctness of our scheme. Then we prove that our scheme is secure against all
types of adversaries.
5.1. Correctness
The correctness of the scheme can be directly verified by the following equations.
σ1 = e
σW1
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)r ′a
gxbyb
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi
)rb
, pkcx

= e
(
gxaya(u′
∏
i∈W
ui)ra+r
′
agxbyb
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi
)rb
, gxc
)
= e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ3
)xc
.
5.2. Unforgeability
Unforgeability against type 2 adversary
Theorem 1. If there exists a type 2 adversaryA2 who can (t, qps, qv, ) breaks our designated verifier proxy signature scheme,
then there exists another algorithmB who can useA2 to solve an instance of the GBDH problem in (G,GT ) with probability
SuccGBDHB ≥

8(n+ 1)qps
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in time
t ′ ≤ ((2n+ 4)qps + nqv + 2)t1 + 5qvt2 + (3n+ 7qps + qv + 5)T1 + 3qvT2 + (qps + 4qv)te
where t1, t2 are the time for a multiplication in G and GT respectively, T1, T2 are the time for an exponentiation in G and GT
respectively, and te is the time for a paring computation in (G,GT ).
Proof. Assume thatB receives a randomGBDHproblem instance (g, ga, gb, gc) of a bilinear group (G,GT )whose orders are
both a prime number p, his goal is to output e(g, g)abc with the help of the DBDH oracleODBDH .B will runA2 as a subroutine
and act asA2’s challenger.B will responseA2’s queries in the following way.
Setup: B sets an integer l = 4qps and chooses an integer k, uniformly at random between 0 and n. B then chooses some
random numbers (xa, ya, r0, r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Zp. Additionally, B chooses a value x′ and a random n-vector, Ex = (xi) where
x′, xi ∈ Zl. Finally, B picks randomly a value y′ and a random n-vector, Ey = (yi) where y′, yi ∈ Zp. These values are kept
internal toB.
Again, for a message M and a warrantW , we letM ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} andW ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all i for which
Mi = 1 andWi = 1. For ease of analysis, we define three functions F(M), J(M) and K(M) just as in Waters’ scheme [25].
(1) F(M) = (p− lk)+ x′ +∑i∈M xi
(2) J(M) = y′ +∑i∈M yi
(3) K(M) =
{
0, if x′ +
∑
i∈M xi = 0 (mod l);
1, otherwise.
ThenB sets the public keys of the users and common parameters as follows.
(1) B assigns u′ = g r0 , ui = g ri (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and Eu = (u1, u2, . . . , un).
(2) B assigns the public key of the original signer (pkax, pkay) = (gxa , gya).
(3) B assigns the public key of the proxy signer (pkbx, pkby) = (ga, gb) and designated verifier’s public key pkcx = gc where
ga, gb, gc are the inputs of the GBDH problem.
(4) B assignsm′ = pkp−kl+x′by gy′ andmi = pkxibygyi and sets Em = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn).
Note that at this time,m′
∏
i∈M mi = pkF(M)by g J(M).
B returns (G,GT , e, p, g, u′, Eu,m′, Em) and (pkax, pkay, pkbx, pkby, pkcx, xa, ya) toA2.
Proxy signature queries: SupposeA2 issues a designated verifier proxy signature query for an n-bit messageM under the
warrantW .
• If K(M) = 0,B terminates the simulation and reports failure.
• If K(M) 6= 0, which indicates that F(M) 6= 0 (mod p), since we can assume p > nl for any reasonable values of
p, n, l [25], B can construct a valid designated verifier proxy signature by picking r1, r2 ∈ Zp randomly and computes
σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3)where
σ1 = e
(
pk
−J(M)
F(M)
bx
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi
)r1 (
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)r2
gxaya , pkcx
)
σ2 = g r2 , σ3 = pk
−1
F(M)
bx g
r1 .
Correctness
σ1 = e
(
pk
−J(M)
F(M)
bx
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi
)r1 (
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)r2
gxaya , pkcx
)
= e
(
pk
−J(M)
F(M)
bx (pk
F(M)
by g
J(M))r1
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)r2
gxaya , pkcx
)
= e
(
pkaby(pk
F(M)
by g
J(M))
−a
F(M) (pkF(M)by g
J(M))r1
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)r2
gxaya , pkcx
)
= e
(
pkaby(pk
F(M)
by g
J(M))
r1− aF(M)
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)r2
gxaya , pkcx
)
= e
(
gab(pkF(M)by g
J(M))rˆgxaya
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)r2
, pkcx
)
= e
gab (u′∏
i∈W
ui
)r2
gxaya
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi
)rˆ
, pkcx
 .
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Note that σ3 = pk
−1
F(M)
bx g
r1 = g r1− aF(M) = g rˆ .
Verify queries: SupposeA2 issues a verify query for the message/signature pair (M,W , σ1, σ2, σ3).
• If F(M) = 0,B submitsg, ga, gb, gc, σ1
e(gc, gya)xae(gc, σ2)
r0+
∑
i∈W
ri
e(gc, σ3)J(M)

to the DBDH oracle ODBDH .B outputs ‘‘Valid’’ if ODBDH returns 1. Otherwise,B outputs ‘‘Invalid’’.
Correctness
If (M,W , σ1, σ2, σ3) is a valid designated verifier proxy signature, then we have
σ1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ3
)xc
= e(gxa , gya)ce(ga, gb)ce
(
g
r0+
∑
i∈W
ri
, σ2
)c
e(g J(M), σ3)c
= e(g, g)abce(gc, gya)xae(gc, σ2)
r0+
∑
i∈W
ri
e(gc, σ3)J(M)
which indicatesg, ga, gb, gc, σ1
e(gc, gya)xae(gc, σ2)
r0+
∑
i∈W
ri
e(gc, σ3)J(M)

is a valid BDH tuple.
• If F(M) 6= 0, B can compute a valid proxy signature on this message M under the same warrantW just as he responses
to proxy signature queries. Let (M,W , σ ′1, σ
′
2, σ
′
3) be the signature computed byB. ThenB submits(
g, m′
∏
i∈M
mi,
σ3
σ ′3
, gc,
σ1
σ ′1
e
(
gc,
σ ′2
σ2
)r0+∑
i∈W
ri
)
to the DBDH oracle.B outputs ‘‘Valid’’ if ODBDH returns 1. Otherwise,B outputs ‘‘Invalid’’.
Correctness
If (M,W , σ1, σ2, σ3) is a valid designated verifier proxy signature, then we have
σ1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ3
)xc
.
Similarly, since (M,W , σ ′1, σ
′
2, σ
′
3) is another valid proxy signature computed byB, then
σ ′1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ ′2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ ′3
)xc
.
We can obtain
σ1
σ ′1
=
 e(u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ2)
e(u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ ′2)
xc  e(m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ3)
e(m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ ′3)
xc
= e
(
g
r0+
∑
i∈W
ri
,
σ2
σ ′2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi,
σ3
σ ′3
)xc
= e
(
gc,
σ2
σ ′2
)r0+∑
i∈W
ri
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi,
σ3
σ ′3
)c
.
Therefore,
σ1
σ ′1
e
(
gc,
σ ′2
σ2
)r0+∑
i∈W
ri
= e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi,
σ3
σ ′3
)c
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which indicates that(
g, m′
∏
i∈M
mi,
σ3
σ ′3
, gc,
σ1
σ ′1
e
(
gc,
σ ′2
σ2
)r0+∑
i∈W
ri
)
is a valid BDH tuple.
IfB does not abort during the simulation,A2 will output a valid designated verifier proxy signature σ ∗ = (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 , σ ∗3 )
under the messageM∗ and warrantW ∗ with success probability .
(1) If F(M∗) 6= 0,B will abort.
(2) Otherwise, F(M∗) = 0,B computes and outputs
σ ∗1
e(gc, gya)xae(gc, σ ∗2 )
r0+
∑
i∈W∗
ri
e(gc, σ ∗3 )J(M
∗)
as the value of e(g, g)abc .
This completes the description of the simulation. Now we have to assessB’s probability of success.B will not abort if both
the following conditions hold.
A:B does not abort during the ProxySign queries.
B: F(M∗) = 0 (mod p).
The success probability ofB is SuccGBDHB = Pr[A ∧ B].
Pr[A ∧ B] = Pr[A]Pr[B|A] = Pr
[
qps⋂
i=1
K(Mi) 6= 0
]
Pr
[
x+
∑
i∈M∗
xi = lk|A
]
=
(
1− Pr
[
qps⋃
i=1
K(Mi) = 0
])
Pr
[
x+
∑
i∈M∗
xi = lk|A
]
≥
(
1− qps
l
)
Pr
[
x+
∑
i∈M∗
xi = lk|A
]
= 1
n+ 1
(
1− qps
l
)
Pr[K [M∗] = 0|A]
= 1
n+ 1
(
1− qps
l
) Pr[K(M∗) = 0]
Pr(A)
Pr[A|K [M∗] = 0]
≥ 1
(n+ 1)l
(
1− qps
l
)
Pr[A|K [M∗] = 0]
≥ 1
n+ 1
(
1− qps
l
)(
1− Pr
[
qps⋃
i=1
K(Mi) = 0|K(M∗) = 0
])
= 1
(n+ 1)l
(
1− qps
l
)2
≥ 1
(n+ 1)l
(
1− 2qps
l
)
.
Therefore, SuccGBDHB ≥ 1(n+1)l (1− 2qpsl ). We can optimize it by setting l = 4qps, then
SuccGBDHB ≥

8(n+ 1)qps . 
Unforgeability against type 3 adversary
Theorem 2. If there exists a type 3 adversary A3 who can (t, qw, qps, qv, ) breaks our designated verifier proxy signature
scheme, then there exists another algorithmBwho canuseA3 to solve an instance of theGBDHproblem in (G,GT )with probability
SuccGBDHB ≥

3(n+ 1)3(3(qw + qps))qv+2
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in time
t ′ ≤ ((n+ 2)qw + (5n+ 9)qps + (n+ 3)qv)t1 + 3qvt2 + (4qw + 10qps + 4qv)T1 + 3qvT2 + (2qps + 6qv)te
where t1, t2 are the time for a multiplication in G and GT respectively, T1, T2 are the time for an exponentiation in G and GT
respectively, and te is the time for a paring computation in (G,GT ).
Proof. Assume thatB receives a randomGBDHproblem instance (g, ga, gb, gc) of a bilinear group (G,GT )whose orders are
both a prime number p, his goal is to output e(g, g)abc with the help of the GBDH oracleODBDH .B will runA3 as a subroutine
and act asA3’s challenger.B will responseA3’s queries as follows.
Setup:B chooses two integers `a, `b, and other two integers, ka, kb, uniformly at random between 0 and n. Then it chooses
two values x′a, x′b and two random n-vectors, Exa = (xai), Exb = (xbi)where x′a, xai ∈R Z`a , x′b, xbi ∈R Z`b . Additionally,B chooses
two values y′a, y′b and two random n-vectors Eya = (yai), Eyb = (ybi)where y′a, y′b, yai, ybi ∈R Zp.B keeps all the values secret.
Again, for a message M and a warrantW , we letM ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} andW ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all i for which
Mi = 1 andWi = 1. For ease of analysis, we define six functions Fa(W ), Fb(M), Ja(W ), Jb(M) and Ka(W ), Kb(M) just as in
[25,9].
(1) Fa(W ) = (p− `aka)+ x′a +
∑
i∈W xai, Ja(W ) = y′a +
∑
i∈W yai,
Ka(W ) =
{
0, if x′a +
∑
i∈X
xai ≡ 0 (mod `a)
1, otherwise
(2) Fb(M) = (p− `bkb)+ x′b +
∑
i∈M xbi, Jb(M) = y′b +
∑
i∈M ybi,
Kb(M) =
{
0, if x′b +
∑
i∈X
xbi ≡ 0 (mod `b)
1, otherwise.
ThenB sets the public keys of the users and common parameters as follows.
(1) B assigns the public keys of the original signer and designated verifier as
pkax = ga, pkay = gb, pkcx = gc
where ga, gb, gc are the input of the Gap Diffie–Hellman problem.
(2) B chooses two random numbers xb, yb ∈ Z∗p and sets the proxy signer’s public key as
pkbx = gxb , pkby = gyb .
(3) B assigns u′ = pkp−ka`a+x′aay gy′a , ui = pkxaiay gyai , Eu = (u1, u2, . . . , un)
(4) B assigns,m′ = pkp−kb`b+x′bay gy′b ,mi = pkxbiby gybi , Em = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn).
B returns (G1,GT , e, p, g, Eu, u′, Em,m′) and (pkax, pkay, pkbx, pkby, pkcx, xb, yb) toA3.
Note that, at this time,
u′
∏
i∈W
ui = pkFa(W )ay g Ja(W ), m′
∏
i∈M
mi = pkFb(M)ay g Jb(M).
Delegation queries: SupposeA3 issues a delegation query for an n-bit warrantW .
(1) If Ka(W ) = 0,B terminates the simulation and reports failure.
(2) If Ka(W ) 6= 0, which implies Fa(W ) 6= 0 (mod p) [25], B can construct the delegation of this warrant by choosing a
random ra ∈ Zp and computing:
σW = (σW1 , σW2) =
(
pk
−Ja(W )
Fa(W )
ax
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)ra
, pk
−1
Fa(W )
ax g ra
)
.
Correctness
σW1 = pk
−Ja(W )
Fa(W )
ax
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)ra
= pk
−Ja(W )
Fa(W )
ax (pkFa(W )ay g
Ja(W ))ra
= pkaay(pkFa(W )ay g Ja(W ))
−a
Fa(W ) (pkFa(W )ay g
Ja(W ))ra
= pkaay(pkFa(W )ay g Ja(W ))ra−
a
Fa(W )
= pkaay(pkFa(W )ay g Ja(W ))rˆa = pkaay
(
u′
∏
i∈M
ui
)rˆa
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σW2 = pk
−1
Fa(W )
ax g ra = g
−a
Fa(W ) g ra = g ra− aFa(W ) = g rˆa .
ProxySign queries: SupposeA3 issues a designated verifier proxy signature query for an n-bitmessageM under thewarrant
W .
(1) If Ka(W ) = 0, Kb(M) = 0,B terminates the simulation and reports failure.
(2) If Ka(W ) = 0, Kb(M) 6= 0, B can construct a proxy signature by choosing randomly ra, rb ∈ Zp and computing
σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3), where
σ1 = e
(
pk
−Jb(M)
Fb(M)
ax
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)ra
gxbyb
(
v′
∏
i∈M
vi
)rb
, pkcx
)
σ2 = g ra , σ3 = pk
−1
Fb(M)
ax g rb .
Correctness
σ1 = e
(
pk
−Jb(M)
Fb(M)
ax
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)ra
gxbyb
(
v′
∏
i∈M
vi
)rb
, pkcx
)
= e
(
pk
−Jb(M)
Fb(M)
ax
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)ra
gxbyb(pkFb(M)ay g
Jb(M))rb , pkcx
)
= e
(
pkaay(pk
Fb(M)
ay g
Jb(M))
−a
Fb(M) (u′
∏
i∈W
ui)ragxbyb(pkFb(M)ay g
Jb(M))rb , pkcx
)
= e
(
pkaay
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)ra
gxbyb(pkFb(M)ay g
Jb(M))
rb− aFb(M) , pkcx
)
= e(gab
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui
)ra
gxbyb
(
v′
∏
i∈M
vi
)rb− aFb(M)
, pkcx)
= e
g skaxskay(u′∏
i∈W
ui)ragxbyb
(
v′
∏
i∈M
vi
)rˆb
, pkcx
 .
and σ2 = g ra , σ3 = pk
−1
Fb(M)
ax g rb = g rb−
a
Fb(M) = g rˆb . Therefore
σ1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ2
)xc
e
(
v′
∏
i∈M
vi, σ3
)xc
.
(3) If Ka(W ) 6= 0, B can compute the delegation of the warrantW as he does in response to the delegation queries. Since
B knows the secret key xb, yb of the proxy signer, B can run the ProxySign algorithm to compute the proxy signature
and return it toA3.
Verify queries: SupposeA3 issues a verify query for the message/signature pair σ = (M,W , σ1, σ2, σ3).
(1) If Fa(W ) 6= 0 and Fb(M) 6= 0,B terminates the simulation.
(2) If Fa(W ) = 0, Fb(M) = 0,B submits(
g, ga, gb, gc,
σ1
e(gc, gyb)xbe(gc, σ2)Ja(W )e(gc, σ3)Jb(M)
)
to the DBDH oracle ODBDH .B outputs ‘‘Valid’’ if ODBDH returns 1. Otherwise,B outputs ‘‘Invalid’’.
Correctness
If (M,W , σ1, σ2, σ3) is a valid designated verifier proxy signature and Fa(W ) = 0, Fb(M) = 0, we have
σ1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ3
)xc
= e(ga, gb)ce(gxb , gyb)ce(g Ja(W ), σ2)ce(g Jb(M), σ3)c
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which indicates that(
g, ga, gb, gc,
σ1
e(gc, gyb)xbe(gc, σ2)Ja(W )e(gc, σ3)Jb(M)
)
is a valid BDH tuple.
(3) If Fa(W ) = 0, Fb(M) 6= 0,B can compute a valid proxy signature on this messageM under the same warrantW just as
the second case that he responses to proxy signature queries. Let (M,W , σ ′1, σ
′
2, σ
′
3) be the signature computed by B.
B submits(
(gb)Fb(M)g Jb(M),
σ3
σ ′3
, gc,
(
σ1
σ ′1
)
e
(
gc,
σ ′2
σ2
)Ja(W ))
to the DBDH oracle ODBDH .B outputs ‘‘Valid’’ if ODBDH returns 1. Otherwise,B outputs ‘‘Invalid’’.
Correctness
If (M,W , σ1, σ2, σ3) is a valid designated verifier proxy signature, then
σ1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ3
)xc
.
Similarly, since (M,W , σ ′1, σ
′
2, σ
′
3) is another valid proxy signature computed byB, then
σ ′1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ ′2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ ′3
)xc
.
We can obtain
σ1
σ ′1
= e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui,
σ2
σ ′2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi,
σ3
σ ′3
)xc
= e
(
g Ja(W ),
σ2
σ ′2
)xc
e
(
pkFb(M)ay g
Jb(M),
σ3
σ ′3
)xc
= e
(
gc,
σ2
σ ′2
)Ja(W )
e
(
(gb)Fb(M)g Jb(M),
σ3
σ ′3
)c
which indicates that(
(gb)Fb(M)g Jb(M),
σ3
σ ′3
, gc,
(
σ1
σ ′1
)
e
(
gc,
σ ′2
σ2
)Ja(W ))
is a valid BDH tuple.
(4) If Fb(M) = 0, Fa(W ) 6= 0,B can compute a valid proxy signature on this messageM under the same warrantW just as
the third case that he responses to a proxy signature query. Let (M,W , σ ′1, σ
′
2, σ
′
3) be the signature computed byB.B
submits(
(gb)Fa(W )g Ja(W ),
σ2
σ ′2
, gc,
(
σ1
σ ′1
)
e
(
gc,
σ ′3
σ3
)Jb(M))
to the DBDH oracle ODBDH .B outputs ‘‘Valid’’ if ODBDH returns 1. Otherwise,B outputs ‘‘Invalid’’.
Correctness
If (M,W , σ1, σ2, σ3) is a valid designated verifier proxy signature, then
σ1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ3
)xc
.
Similarly, since (M,W , σ ′1, σ
′
2, σ
′
3) is another valid proxy signature computed byB, then
σ ′1 = e(pkax, pkay)xc e(pkbx, pkby)xc e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui, σ ′2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi, σ ′3
)xc
.
We can obtain
σ1
σ ′1
= e
(
u′
∏
i∈W
ui,
σ2
σ ′2
)xc
e
(
m′
∏
i∈M
mi,
σ3
σ ′3
)xc
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= e
(
pkFa(W )ay g
Ja(W ),
σ2
σ ′2
)xc
e
(
g Jb(M),
σ3
σ ′3
)xc
= e
(
(gb)Fa(W )g Ja(W ),
σ2
σ ′2
)c
e
(
gc,
σ3
σ ′3
)Jb(M)
which indicates that(
(gb)Fa(W )g Ja(W ),
σ2
σ ′2
, gc,
(
σ1
σ ′1
)
e
(
gc,
σ ′3
σ3
)Jb(M))
is a valid BDH tuple.
If B does not abort during the simulation,A3 will output a valid designated verifier proxy signature σ ∗ = (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 , σ ∗3 ) of
the messageM∗ under the warrantW ∗ with success probability .
(1) If Fa(W ∗) 6= 0, Fb(M∗) 6= 0,B will abort.
(2) Otherwise, Fa(W ∗) = 0, Fb(M∗) = 0,B computes and outputs
σ ∗1
e(gc, gyb)xbe(gc, σ ∗2 )Ja(W
∗)e(gc, σ ∗3 )Jb(M
∗)
as the value of e(g, g)abc .
This completes the description of the simulation. Now we have to assess B’s probability of success. B will not abort if the
following conditions hold.
A: Ka(W ) 6= 0 (mod `a) during Delegation queries
B: Ka(W ) 6= 0 (mod `a) or Kb(M) 6= 0 (mod `b) during ProxySign queries
C: Fa(W ) = 0 (mod p) or Fb(M) = 0 (mod p) during Verify queries
D: Fa(W ∗) = 0 (mod p) and Fb(M∗) = 0 (mod p) in output phase.
The success probability is SuccGBDHB = Pr[A ∧ B ∧ C ∧ D]ε. Now we compute this probability using Waters’ technique [25].
Pr[A ∧ B ∧ C ∧ D] = Pr
[
qw⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) 6= 0
qps⋂
i=1
(
Ka(Wi) 6= 0
⋃
Kb(Mi) 6= 0
)
qv⋂
i=1
(
Fa(Wi) = 0 (mod p)
⋃
Fb(M) = 0 (mod p)
)⋂(
Fa(W ∗) = 0 (mod p)
⋂
Fb(M∗) = 0 (mod p)
)]
≥ Pr
[
qw+qps⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) 6= 0
qv⋂
i=1
Fa(Wi) = 0 (mod p)
⋂
Fa(W ∗) = 0 (mod p)
⋂
Fb(M∗) = 0 (mod p)
]
= Pr
[
qw+qps⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) 6= 0
]
Pr
[
qv⋂
i=1
Fa(Wi) = 0 (mod p)
⋂
Fa(W ∗) = 0 (mod p)
⋂
Fb(M∗) = 0 (mod p)|
qw+qps⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) 6= 0
]
≥ 1
(n+ 1)3
(
1− qw + qps
`a
)
Pr
[
qv⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) = 0
⋂
Ka(W ∗) = 0
⋂
Kb(M∗) = 0|
qw+qps⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) 6= 0
]
= 1
(n+ 1)3
(
1− qw + qps
`a
) Pr[ qv⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) = 0⋂ Ka(W ∗) = 0⋂ Kb(M∗) = 0]
Pr[
qw+qps⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) 6= 0]
Pr
[
qw+qps⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) 6= 0|
qv⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) = 0
⋂
Ka(W ∗) = 0
⋂
Kb(M∗) = 0
]
≥ 1
(n+ 1)3`qv+1a `b
(
1− qw + qps
`a
)
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×
(
1− Pr
[
qw+qps⋃
i=1
Ka(Wi) 6= 0|
qv⋂
i=1
Ka(Wi) = 0
⋂
Ka(W ∗) = 0
⋂
Kb(M∗) = 0
])
≥ 1
(n+ 1)3`qv+1a `b
(
1− qw + qps
`a
)2
≥ 1
(n+ 1)3`qv+1a `b
(
1− 2(qw + qps)
`a
)
.
Therefore, SuccGBDHB ≥ 
(n+1)3`qv+1a `b
(1− 2(qW+qPS )
`a
).We can get a simplified result by reasonably setting `a = `b = 3(qw+qps),
then
SuccGBDHB ≥

3(n+ 1)3(3(qw + qps))qv+2 . 
6. Conclusion
We have proposed a new designated verifier proxy scheme and have proven that the scheme is secure without random
oracles. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first designated verifier proxy signature scheme that can be proven secure
in the standard model. The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman problem.
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